Enjoy? Or something? Cross-posted from Mondoweiss. Here is Taylor flailing in response. It is sad.
At Mondoweiss and elsewhere, a discussion about “violence” versus “non-violence” has been taking place over the past month-or-so, since the massacre aboard the Mavi Marmara, revealingly joined recently by Nicholas Kristof. In the face of empirical and ethical deconstructions of the argument for “principled” non-violence for Palestinians and the total abnegation of force by solidarity activists, Matthew Taylor has offered a lengthy rejoinder re-stating his case for the moral, ethical, and pragmatic efficacy of Palestinian non-violence. Taylor begins by defining “violence,” goes on to re-assert the utility of Gandhi, accuses me of mis-understanding Gandhi, condemns Palestinian violence, and moves on to a How-To Guide for the Palestinian Resistance.
Here’s Taylor defining “non-violence”:
Nonviolence is a powerful method to harmonize relationships among people (and all living things) for the establishment of justice and the ultimate well-being of all parties. It draws its power from awareness of the profound truth to which the wisdom traditions of all cultures, science, and common experience bear witness: that all life is one.
If we can’t define “non-violence” and “violence,” we can’t discuss them. Is the above a definition or non-sensical babble? The latter. No definition, no discussion. Earlier, I suggested that it is not so simple to define “non-violence” and “violence,” a suggestion that the gobbledygook above inadvertently confirms. Try a very quick thought experiment. I am in a room with a man holding a gun to my head. I have a stick in my hand with a spike in it. There is another person in that room. If I refuse to use force against that man by hitting him—possibly lethally—with my stick, he will kill me, then kill the other person. If I kill him, I will save the other person and myself. What kind of “non-violence” causes excess violent deaths and redounds to violence? The theorist raises his hand, quavering: “There are exceptions!” Of course there are. Otherwise the tension between theory and ethics would simply rip the argumentative fabric apart. Academic non-violence theory provides for exceptions in the case of sudden and overwhelming force. More colloquially, self-defense, taking its cue from common sense and international law. What “principled non-violence” mainly means in practice is the refusal to use bodily-harming force except when confronted with a deadly threat against which there is no other way to resist.
That exception makes sense. What doesn’t make sense is the principle—building an ethical and moral firewall between a permissible exception for self-defense in the face of immediate, corporeal danger and an exception for self-defense against the structural violence of colonialism, occupation, or capitalism. Especially, this does not make sense when the goal is the minimization of human suffering. The difference is essentially aesthetic—there’s no ready-to-hand alternative to violence in self-defense when the threat is manifest and present, despite the theorist’s aesthetic preference for militant non-violent practice, the inverse of fascist war-fetishizing. Despite the abstract grace of the theory, it needs an exception to shoehorn it into reality.
Continue reading I am done with Matt Taylor. we now return to normal operating hours
