Quick question: what do confused sectors of the Western radical left and the editorial board of the New York Times agree about? That last June's Iranian presidential election, which almost certainly was not fraudulent, was fraudulent, that Ahmadinejad is not the legitimately elected president of Iran, that to analyze or criticize the tactics or ideologies of the green movement is tantamount to Stalinism, and that the correct political stance vis-a-vis the green movement is posting YouTube videos of protesters pummeling working-class basij.
For the NYT, this is a matter of massaging reality so as to prepare the symbolic ground for imperial warfare and destabilization. For the Empire, an independent nuclear-capable Iran is haram (forbidden). A state of suicide bombers armed with fissile material? Oh hell no. Muslims can barely be relied upon to refrain from building minarets or misogynistically controlling their women, in stark contrast to the courageous feminism that permeates the West. The repressed men of The Muslim World would almost certainly manifest their frustration in Armageddon if they got remotely near a nuclear weapon, and the West--lily-white pure when it comes to visiting Armageddon upon other people--could not possibly tolerate such a frightening prospect.
Anyway, put to the side the tactical question of where Western leftists should orient their efforts–unremittingly against sanctions, clearly, which are option one in the rejectionistist imperial armory. (Putting this political question aside is slightly ridiculous since it’s actually the only relevant issue right now for leftists or liberals). And then move on to some poll analysis that should seal shut the debate about Ahmadinejad’s social support–a proxy for Iranian sentiment concerning populist economic policies. This is something I harp about with abrasive frequency. When American leftists have no movement--like right now--we look around for something distractingly beguiling. In this case, something so inchoate and that pulls in so many directions that it makes it easy to impose our revolutionary hopes upon a non-revolutionary situation.
Yes, millions mobilized as part of the Green Wave in June and more recently during Ashura. The green movement is real. But here’s the problem. The Iranian state is strong, deeply-embedded in civil society through a range of social welfare programs, many of them directed towards the rural poor, others benefiting the urban lower-classes. And the Iranian government, extending well beyond Ahmadinejad, is also repressive and anti-democratic. Repressive and anti-democratic governments frequently provoke backlashes in favor of democracy. And sometimes, those backlashes redound negatively upon the working-classes. Sometimes authoritarianism brings prosperity. This stuff is fairly obvious and banal, but debate on Iran tends to cliche, train-wrecked syllogism, and the crafting of straw-men, so sometimes it’s helpful to pedantically lay out the obvious, which I do by way of massively elliptical introduction to a poll from WorldPublicOpinion. Its gist? Iranians may not like their government but they do think Ahmadinejad is their legitimately elected president. The reason a majority of Iranians voted for him? Probably because his government is perceived, more-or-less rightly, as one in favor of economic populism within a global neo-liberal regime of accumulation. My thinking? So long as the Green Movement fails to braid together economic redistribution and political liberalism, it will not gain the crucial societal mass that will enable it to become a force capable of restructuring the Iranian state so as to enable it to defend the Iranian people from both the economic and military arms of the Empire. Traditionally, defense of economic redistribution and fighting the empire were the concerns of radicals, dissidents, and socialists. So were facts. In modern times, not so much.
Indications of fraud in the June 12 Iranian presidential election, together with large-scale street demonstrations, have led to claims that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not actually win the election, and that the majority of Iranians perceive their government as illegitimate and favor regime change.
An analysis of multiple polls of the Iranian public from three different sources finds little evidence to support such conclusions.
The analysis conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland (PIPA), was based on:
- a series of 10 recently-released polls conducted by the University of Tehran; eight conducted in the month before the June 12 election and two conducted in the month after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted within Iran
- a poll by GlobeScan conducted shortly after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted within Iran
- a poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org (managed by PIPA) conducted August 27–September 10, based on telephone interviews made by calling into Iran
The study sought to address the widely-discussed hypotheses that Ahmadinejad did not win the June 12 election and that the Iranian people perceive their government as illegitimate. It also sought to explore the assumption that the opposition represents a movement favoring a substantially different posture toward the United States. The analysis of the data found little evidence to support any of these hypotheses.
Steven Kull, director of PIPA, said, “Our analysis suggests that it would not be prudent to base US policy on the assumption that the Iranian public is in a pre-revolutionary state of mind.”
On the question of whether Ahmadinejad won the June 12 election, in the week before the election and after the election, in all polls a majority said they planned to or did vote for Ahmadinejad. These numbers ranged from 52 to 57% immediately before the election and 55 to 66% after the election.
Steven Kull comments, “These findings do not prove that there were no irregularities in the election process. But they do not support the belief that a majority rejected Ahmadinejad.”
The analysis did reveal factors that could have contributed to the impression that Ahmadinejad did not win. University of Tehran polls show that in the first few weeks of the campaign his support dropped precipitously and he did not enjoy majority support in the city of Tehran. But in the week before the election, his support recovered outside the capital.
Going into the election 57% said they expected Ahmadinejad to win. Thus it is not surprising that, in several post-election polls, more than seven in ten said they saw Ahmadinejad as the legitimate president. About eight in ten said the election was free and fair.
The polls did reveal some reservations about the government. Less than a majority expressed full confidence in the Guardian Council (42%) and the Ministry of the Interior (38%). While over eight in ten said they were satisfied with the current system of government, in June less than a majority (49%) said they were very satisfied and this number dropped to 41% in July.
However none of the polls found indications of support for regime change. Large majorities, including majorities of Mousavi supporters, endorse the Islamist character of the regime such as having a body of Islamic scholars with the power to veto laws they see as contrary to sharia.
To address the possibility that the data collected within Iran may have been fabricated, PIPA compared the patterns of responses, including within subgroups, in data collected inside Iran to those collected by calling into Iran from the outside. Steven Kull comments, “The patterns of responses at many levels are so similar, whether the data was collected inside Iran or by calling into Iran, that it is hard to conclude that these data were fabricated.”
Another concern is that Iranian respondents were not answering candidly out of fear of some type of reprisal for making statements in support of the opposition or critical of the regime, particularly in the post-election environment. As noted above, on some questions majorities expressed views that were less than fully laudatory of the government.
Still there was the fact that after the election, the numbers expressing support for Mousavi diminished suggests that some self-censoring may have been occurring. Thus PIPA put special emphasis on analyzing the responses of those who felt bold enough to say that they voted for the opposition on the assumption that they would be frank on other issues as well. While Mousavi supporters are less affirmative of the legitimacy of the regime than the public as a whole, still a majority says that they believe that Ahmadinejad is the legitimate president and affirm the Islamist nature of the regime.
Some analysts have suggested that if the opposition were to gain power this would lead to fundamental changes in the Iranian posture toward the US. Focusing on those respondents who said they voted for Mousavi, as an approximation of the opposition, PIPA found that a majority were ready to negotiate with the US on a number of issues, while the Iranian public as a whole was more divided. However, Mousavi supporters, like the general public, were quite negative in their views of the US government and were strongly committed to Iran’s nuclear program.
A majority of Mousavi supporters did favor diplomatic relations with the US, and were ready to make a deal whereby Iran would preclude developing nuclear weapons through intrusive international inspections in exchange for the removal of sanctions. However, this was equally true of the majority of all Iranians.
Full Report (PDF)
Questionnaire with Findings, Methodology for All Three Surveys (PDF)WPO Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)
GlobeScan Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)
[Thanks Yoshie]
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You are such a blind nationalist its amazing. After this article I wouldn’t trust any data you put on this website. Really? A study from the University of Tehran after many of its students and professors were taken away and you take this seriously? What do you think the conclusions were going to be?
You do realize that Gowans has stauncly defended Mugabe,right? I don’t mean the whole lenin’s tomb type of stuff with the thing about saying he’s awful but sanctions will only make it worse– he’s dismissed all the electorial violence and got on board the mugabe love train.
Who is discussing Mugabe. Not me, not interested in doing so here, here I am discussing Iran.
Also: You’ll notice Djavid acknowledged infrastructure was also important along with women’s education and electricity.
This is a very interesting post. I’ve always been skeptical about the ‘Ahmadinejad = dictator’ thesis, the man seems genuinely popular in Iran.
John, would you rather believe the Imperial and Zionist sources that have a unequivocal cui bono to discredit all things Iranian for their own nefarious purposes?
Thanks. He is popular, from what I can tell, not reading Farsi. Most analysis misses that point and then heads off the deep end.
Re: John, he would rather believe those sources, and in fact believes them every day. Traumatized right-wing Zionist.
And there’s some of this: http://antonyloewenstein.com/tag/iran/
Once again, “Sometimes authoritarianism brings prosperity.” but that doesn’t make abuses of protesters a okay.
Jenny:
Abuse of protesters can never be condoned but would you like me to show some abuse of protesters by the British policy, here in our very own bastion of democracy and free speech? Very recently? Or a little longer ago? How bloody do you want it to be?
The trouble with demos is that very few of them aren’t hijacked by a few hotheads that start attacking property, setting fire to things etc. Now would you like to see how the police (and the MSM, of course) react to that kind of thing in that other bastion of FREEDOM, Holy Land II?
So? Doesn’t make the Iranian police tactics better. Authority abuse is fucking athority abuse no matter what goddamned country.
so why vent spleen on a country subject to imperial destabilization, Jenny, unless you want to sound holy?
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This post was mentioned on Twitter by maxajl: New blog posting, Yes, This means Ahmadinejad Won the Election — http://tinyurl.com/ycp96kw...
Jenny, please stop playing l’ingenue, all I’m saying is that Western govs. are hypocritical when calling Iran doing the same: cracking down on some manifestations of the demos.
leaving aside the fact that a careful reading of the article cited by Yoshie reveals that it does not prove that Ahmadinejad won the election (the pollsters expressly disavow any such reading), it now appears that some elements of the Marxist left are highlighting the electoral process as an indication of political legitimacy
oh my, what would Lenin and Trotsky have said?
Richard,
I wrote “last June’s Iranian presidential election, which almost certainly was not fraudulent.” Pollsters always expressly disavow such readings. But the election itself has to be considered non fraudulent until there is compelling evidence otherwise. Instead there’s plenty of compelling evidence say that it wasn’t fraudulent. do you disagree?
I don’t know “some elements of the Marxist left” refers to. can’t be me. electoral processes are indications of political/electoral legitimacy–indications only, legitimacy being a complicated affair and you anyway know where stand on the legitimacy of state-based politics so the comment is odd, especially in light of what i have to say about the green movement and economic redistribution and “restructuring the iranian state.” i kind of think you’re responding to the abrasive tone–deliberately abrasive and abrasive to the people i link to quite deliberately.
Max, I was primarily referencing Yoshie’s willingness to defend the election result as if it were supportive of a leftist stance in regard to the Ahmadijedad regime. As you know, an election outcome, by itself, is not indicative of very much from either a Marxist or anarchist perspective, as people from both socialist backgrounds were suspicious of them. At best, they cited them in association with other objective analytical critieria. Rather odd, I know, since this is your post, not hers. Anyway, your analysis is persuasive as it regards the relationship between the US, Green Wave and Iran. It does not, however, fully address on old classic left concern: how is a country like Iran most likely to economically develop in a way that benefts everyone, and not just domestic and international elites? (con’t)
Richard,
I will acknowledge that perhaps I continue to give Yoshie too much of the benefit of the doubt but every time she predicts something about how the green movement will play out in any given conjuncture, in its choice—bad choice—of allies, tactics, etc., she has been correct. She has a feel for Iran. Most of us commenting don’t. The green movement seems to make bad choices repeatedly. I don’t think it’s nefarious to chalk that up, in part, to its sociological composition, or to what we know of it, although obviously it’s more complicated than that and I don’t mean to be reductive. We respond one way when a group with one composition protests in Venezuela. We respond, not just in a different manner, but 180 degrees differently to a different set of protests that are not the reverse of the Venezuelan ones but have aspects in common as well as aspects that are different etc. It’s worth wondering why, and noting when this commentary perfectly dovetails with dominant narratives. That is Yoshie’s point I think. Marxists and leftists are supposed to be able to braid class into their analyses. Commentary on Iran ignores it.
(con’t)
I don’t know the answer because I lack the time and the access to sufficient economic and sociological information about the situation there (as do you as well, I imagine), But the interesting thing is, very few seem inclined to address it, even people that should have the time and ability to do so. As for the election itself, my personal opinion is that there was fraud for the purpose of avoiding a runoff, a runoff that Mousavi would have probably lost, anyway. Of course, I can’t prove it, that’s just my opinion based upon what I encountered during and after the election from various sources. Needless to say, I don’t consider my view as one that supports the NYT’s effort to manufacture consent for sanctions, and possibly an attack upon Iran, after all, they seem to be just find with the removal of Zelaya and the election “victory” of Lobo in Honduras. Anyway, Ron and I need to get you back on the radio to provide an update on the Gaza Freedom March.
Regarding internal economic development, this is a major problem. I have actually tried to do what reading I could on the issue, but very little systematic work has been done frankly, especially in the Ahmadinejad years, and there has been enough time. For what it’s worth I find this odd too. More fun to stuff Iran into whatever pre-fab Marxist theoretical schema is handy and bluster than to learn Farsi or at least collate the scholarly work and figure out what went on.
There may well have been fraud but I don’t think it determined the outcome of the election and I do think polling evidence supports this (very cautious and conservative) suggestion. I don’t think your view is one that supports the NYT’s efforts. I think the dominant view on the left is somewhat less nuanced, and somewhat less aware of what exactly are the limits of the non-existent left’s power, which is an attack on those elements of the left to which I linked.
On radio, I’d be happy to talk any day. And to share my difficulties getting into Gaza too. That is worthwhile for an American audience to hear.
Hey look! it’s an interview with an Iranian Labor leader: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbur...
You mean they have labor leaders in Iran? I thought they just pray and protest.
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