Tehran and the Party Line

I don't know a tenth as much about Iran as Robert Dreyfuss, a hundredth as much as Juan Cole, a thousandth as much as Hamid Dabashi. I know enough to be quiet about what I don't know. And I know that when mainstream and liberal-left opinion call an official enemy's election "disputed," or a coup d'état, they either have evidence, or they are waging propaganda war. It's despicable, but it may not matter, at least for now. Events in Iran have, it seems, overtaken the Orientalist fantasies of Western analysts. Consider context, then a quick look at Western reaction.

Iran's top legislative body is now prepared to recount the votes, a procedure opposition candidate Mousavi has rejected (anyway, recall that Mousavi is a pretty recent convert to democraticism).  At least 20 protesters are dead. Iranian state news agencies are confirming at least seven deaths. Robert Fisk reports that many fear there has been a massacre of university students in Tehran. The basij--hardcore militia--have attacked students in Isfahan. Videos of violent repression by jackbooted thugs are coming onto the internet at a quickened clip. Foreign journalists are being ordered to stay in their hotels, although many are apparently ignoring this order. Still, it is reportedly extremely difficult for them to get out of Tehran. The police were also ordered to stand down at the Mousavi rally. This oscillation between violence and toleration of the defiance of illegitimate state orders is indicative of a government in total flux. The situation is almost out of its hands.

The vast deployment of state violence has created a legitimacy crisis for the Iranian state. Governments shouldn't beat up their citizens for participating in non-violent protests. And I should add that I have seen (twitter) reports that police have been deployed without weapons, due to the state's mis-trust of them, and that in any event the police have arrested several rampaging basij, many of whom are Arabs, from Lebanon and elsewhere, and so deemed more trustworthy.

Now, there are at the very least three analytically distinct and I think relevant questions: one, supposing the vote totals are accurate--or even if they are not--how did Ahmadinejad accrue his votes? This is a time for sober reflection on the Iranian government's political and more importantly social policies. It's easy to dismiss the Iranians as tawny idiots, but not exactly laudable. Polls showing strong support for Ahmadinejad should be analyzed, not dismissed out-of-hand.

Two,  and most importantly, what will be the outcome of the demonstrations? To what extent will their composition shift from overwhelmingly middle or upper-middle class students to a more vibrant mix? What will they rally around? This is partially tied to the result of the first question. If Ahmadinejad's numbers are credible, or if he received 40 or 50 percent of the vote, the sociological composition of the demonstrations will be less likely to shift to a broader chunk of the Iranian population. Nevertheless, students' willingness to defy the government, to get beaten, jailed, killed, could well attract workers repulsed by state violence. A video has appeared of orange-garbed garbage-men joining the protesters. This is important. Students alone cannot and should not make a revolution.

Furthermore, it should not be surprising that students are first out in the streets. As Staughton Lynd comments regarding the Vietnam War protests, "Students came first. And this is understandable, given the fact that most students are not yet committed to livelihood and support of a family, and are in a setting and a period of their lives where excitement over general ideas is encouraged." Still, they will have to coalesce around something more alluring than Moussavi's neo-liberal program if unrest is to turn into social progress.

Now, on the election results: Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty wrote yesterday in the Washington Post that

The election results in Iran may reflect the will of the Iranian people...Our survey indicated, though, that Azeris favored Ahmadinejad by 2 to 1 over Mousavi...Iranians view their support for a more democratic system, with normal relations with the United States, as consonant with their support for Ahmadinejad. They do not want him to continue his hard-line policies. Rather, Iranians apparently see Ahmadinejad as their toughest negotiator, the person best positioned to bring home a favorable deal.

Dozens of anecdotal data-points supporting this argument can be found across the internet, including from relatively mainstream sources, including unabashed sectors of the establishment like Stratfor. This isn't evidence that Ahmadinejad won. We still don't know.

Juxtapose with Robert Dreyfuss's Nation piece. The headline is "Iran's Ex-Foreign Minister Yazdi: It's a Coup." Dreyfuss's evidence? Essentially an interview with Iran's ex-Foreign Minister. Thin gruel. Or with Al Giordano's comparisons of the goings-on in Iran with the 2002 military coup d'etat in Venezuela. Hamid Dabashi calls Mousavi a Mandela or a King. Richard Seymour calls the comparison absurd, but remember, Mandela implanted the neo-liberal agenda that's incited profound class struggle in South Africa. Might be a good parallel. Foreign Policy in Focus is simply calling it a coup.

Would progressive reporters take such a ridiculous attitude toward what actually happened in the case of anyone but a cynical demagogue known for mouthing inflammatory statements about the Holocaust?

But the Western reaction, while important, is currently ancillary. There'll be time to analyze this charade. For now, the Iranians hold all attention.

Addendum: I wrote above that "And I should add that I have seen (twitter) reports that police have been deployed without weapons, due to the state's mis-trust of them, and that in any event the police have arrested several rampaging basij, many of whom are Arabs, from Lebanon and elsewhere, and so deemed more trustworthy." Well, this remains true, but it's also true to say that I've heard reports that both Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy exist. I shouldn't've given the reports on Arabs being amongst the basij any credence. The point is debunked here.

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